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Abstract—We introduce the concept of structured synthesis for
Markov decision processes where the structure is induced from
finitely many pre-specified options for a system configuration. The
resulting synthesis problem is in general a nonlinear program-
ming problem (NLP) with integer variables. As solving NLPs
is in general not feasible, we present an alternative approach.
We present a transformation of models specified in the PRISM
probabilistic programming language to models that account for
all possible system configurations by means of nondeterministic
choices. Together with a control module that ensures consistent
configurations throughout the system, this transformation enables
the use of optimized tools for model checking in a black-
box fashion. While this transformation increases the size of a
model, experiments with standard benchmarks show that the
method provides a feasible approach for structured synthesis.
Moreover, we demonstrate the usefulness along a realistic case
study involving surveillance by unmanned aerial vehicles in a
shipping facility.
I. INTRODUCTION
The main problem introduced in this paper is motivated by the
following scenario stemming from the area of physical security.
Consider a shipping facility equipped with a number of ground
sensors to discover potential intruders. The facility operates
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to perform surveillance
and maintenance tasks. Intruders appear randomly, there are
uncertainties in sensor performance, and the operation of the
UAVs is driven by scheduling choices and the activation of
sensors. The natural model to capture such randomization,
uncertainty, and scheduling choices are Markov decision
processes (MDPs), where measures such as “the probability
to encounter dangerous states of the system” or performance
measures such as “the expected cost to achieve a certain goal”
are directly assessable.
System designers, e. g. in the shipping facility scenario,
often have to choose among a pre-specified family of possibly
interdependent options for the system configuration, such as
different sensors or the operating altitude of UAVs. Each of
these options triggers different behavior of the system, such as
different failure probabilities and acquisition cost. We call such
possible design choices and their behavioral consequences an
underlying structure of the system; all concrete instantiations
of the system adhere to this structure. For instance, imagine a
structure describing the option of installing one of two types
of sensors. The cheaper sensor induces a smaller expected cost,
while the more expensive sensor induces a higher probability
of discovering intruders. The changes in the instantiations of
the system are necessarily according to the structure, i. e., the
replacement of one sensor type with the other. A question of
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interest is then which instantiation yields the lowest cost while
it guarantees to adhere to a target specification regarding the
desired probability.
In this paper, we introduce multiple–instance MDPs
(MIMDPs) as an underlying semantic model for structured
synthesis. Arbitrary expressions over system parameters capture
a structure that describes dependencies between uncertain
behavior and system cost. Each parameter may be assigned
a discrete finite set of values out of which it can be instan-
tiated. MIMDPs are inspired by parametric Markov decision
processes [3], [24] (pMDPs), whose transition probabilities
(and cost) are defined by functions over yet-to-be-specified
parameters. However, the existing definitions of pMDPs are
limited in that they only allow for imposing restrictions on
parameter valuations in the form of continuous intervals.
Available methods as implemented in the tools PARAM [11],
PRISM [12], or PROPhESY [20] do not support the definition
of discrete sets of valuations. Consequently, to the best of
our knowledge, the state-of-the-art techniques cannot directly
handle modeling scenarios that appear in structured synthesis.
Another related approach to modeling structured systems is
feature-based modeling as in ProFeat [29], which allows to
specify families of stochastic systems that have the same base
functionality, but differ in the combination of active and inactive
features that trigger additional functionalities. Although feature-
based modeling supports discrete parametrization, it does not
directly offer parametrization of probabilities. Furthermore,
ProFeat enables the analysis of the family in an all-in-one
fashion as opposed to focusing on properties of individual
instantiations.
The formal problem considered in this paper is to compute
an optimal instantiation of parameters and a control strategy for
a given MIMDP subject to reachability specifications and cost
minimization. We define this problem naturally as a non–linear
integer optimization problem (NILP).
As a computationally tractable alternative, we present a
transformation of an MIMDP to an MDP where all possible
parameter instantiations are relayed to nondeterministic choices.
The common language used for model specification in all
available tools is the probabilistic programming language [18]
originally developed for PRISM. We define the transformation
of the MIMDP as a program transformation of such a
probabilistic program. By adding control variables to the
transformed program, we keep track of all instantiations,
ensuring parameter values that are in accordance with the
given structure. We show that optimal measures for the resulting
MDP are optimal for the NILP defining our original problem.
Computing an optimal solution to the original problem is
thereby reduced to MDP model checking, which is equivalent
to solving a linear program (LP) and hence computationally
more tractable. From a practical viewpoint, the transformation
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Fig. 1. A shipping facility that uses UAVs to perform surveillance tasks.
enables the use of all capabilities of model checkers such as
PRISM [12], storm [28], or IscasMC [19].
We illustrate the feasibility of the proposed approach
on several basic case studies from the PRISM benchmark
suite [14]. We also report promising results for a more realistic
case study based on the shipping facility example. In our
experiments, we observe that the transformation from a MIMDP
to an MDP involves an increase in the number of states or
transitions of up to two orders of magnitude. However, using
an efficient model checker, we are able to demonstrate the
applicability of our approach in examples with millions of
states.
In summary, the contribution of this paper is threefold: i)
We define a parametric model supporting discrete valuation
sets and formalize the structured synthesis problem. ii) We
develop a transformation of the parametric model to the PRISM
language allowing us to practically address the structured
synthesis problem. iii) We present a detailed, realistic case
study of a shipping facility as well as experimental evaluation
on standard benchmarks.
II. CASE STUDY
In this section we introduce the case study that originally
motivated the problem and the proposed approach. Several
technical details are in the Appendix.
Scenario: Consider a hypothetical scenario in which a
shipping facility uses one or more UAVs equipped with electro-
optical (EO) sensors to perform surveillance tasks over various
facility assets as shown in Fig. 1. These assets include an
Airfield with a Runway and Airfield Office, a Truck Depot, a
Warehouse, a Main Office, a Shipyard with a Shipyard Office,
and a small bay that is partitioned into West Bay, East Bay,
and Shipyard areas. An external Highway connects to the Main
Gate, and a nearby Bridge crosses a Stream that cuts through
the facility and empties into the bay. The facility is surrounded
by a fence, but points where waterways run under the fence
might allow human intruders to enter. These points and the
bay are monitored by Sensor 1, Sensor 2, Sensor 3, and a
Bay Sensor Network. All of these ground sensors can detect
intruders with an adjustable false alarm rate and record the
direction in which detected intruders were moving.
UAVs take off and land from an area near the Ground Control
Station (GCS). For each of the facility assets, a UAV can be
tasked to perform a point, line, or area search as indicated in
Fig. 1. Each of these search tasks requires the UAV to fly a
certain distance to get to the task location, carry out the task,
and fly back to the GCS. For point searches, simply flying to
the point and back is enough. For line searches, the UAV must
fly to one end, follow the line, and fly back from the other end.
For area searches, the UAV must fly to one corner of the area,
perform sequential parallel passes over it until the entire area
has been covered by the UAV’s sensor footprint, then fly back
from the terminating corner. Note that sensor footprint size
decreases with altitude, so more passes are needed to cover an
area as a UAV’s altitude decreases.
A UAV can also be tasked to fly to and query the ground
sensors. If a ground sensor reports that an intruder has been
detected since the last time a UAV visited, the UAV flies to the
area the intruder was heading toward and performs a search;
otherwise, the UAV can return to the GCS and continue on to
another task. Probabilities for which areas intruders are likely
to head toward might be estimated over time or assumed to
be uniform if data are not available. We assume surveillance
occurs frequently enough that at most one intruder will pass
by a ground sensor before it is queried by a UAV. Similar
problems involving UAVs searching for intruders based on
ground sensor information are discussed in, e.g., [17] and [23].
System Configuration, Safety, and Cost: A configuration
of the shipyard facility refers to the types of ground sensors
that are used and the types of EO sensors installed onboard the
UAVs. We measure safety of the shipping facility in terms of the
probability to successfully detect intruders. The performance
measure describes the expected cost for the shipping facility
given the system uncertainties. Different types of sensors
provide different tradeoffs between safety and performance.
Our goal is to find a configuration for the shipyard surveillance
system that ensures a certain safety probability on detecting
intruders while minimizing cost.
Different ground sensor types and EO sensor types result
in safety and performance tradeoffs for several reasons. First,
each sensor type has a different one-time purchase cost. In
turn, each sensor type has tunable parameters that result in a
tradeoff between the probability of detecting an intruder and
cost in terms of UAV flight time, with sensors that have a
higher purchase cost providing a better tradeoff. The tradeoff
between intruder detection and UAV flight time is also affected
by UAV operating altitude, which is adjustable.
This tradeoff can be understood in the context of two factors.
The first is ground sample distance (GSD) [26], i. e., the number
of meters per pixel of images sent back by a UAV, which
depends on UAV altitude and EO sensor resolution. The second
is the ground sensor receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
[9], i. e., the tunable true positive versus false positive rate.
Both true and false positives result in a UAV performing an
area search for intruders, where the cost of the area search
depends on UAV altitude.
We now describe in detail how the probabilistic parameters
relating to GSD and ROC can be adjusted by acquiring different
types of sensors, tuning sensor parameters, or changing UAV
operating altitude, and how these choices affect cost.
Basic Task Costs: For tasks that do not involve intruder
detection, cost is driven mainly by manpower, logistics, and
maintenance requirements, which roughly corresponds to cost
per flight second cf . Suppose the UAVs in this scenario all
fly at some standard operating ground speed vg measured in
meters per second. The cost c(t) for a task t that does not
involve intruder detection then depends in a straightforward
way on the distance d(t) that a UAV must fly:
c(t) = d(t)cf/vg. (1)
Image GSD: An important consideration for UAV surveil-
lance tasks is the amount of visual detail a human operator
needs to perform analysis of collected images, especially
for small objects such as human intruders. The amount of
resolvable detail depends on the number of pixels comprising
objects of interest in the images, which increases as GSD
decreases. GSD can be decreased by either decreasing altitude
or increasing horizontal resolution of the EO sensor. On the
other hand, altitude can be changed during flight, sensor
resolution cannot, since it depends on the specifications
of the installed EO sensor. For this scenario, we consider
three common EO sensor resolution options (480p, 720p,
1080p), with hypothetical purchase prices ($15k, $30k, $45k,
respectively).
We can use GSD in conjunction with the Johnson crite-
ria [1] to estimate the probability that a human operator can
successfully analyze an object in an image based on the type
of analysis task (i.e., detection, recognition, or identification)
and the number of pixels comprising an object of interest in
an image. For each type of task and a corresponding digital
image, a quantity n50 defines the number of pairs of pixel lines
across the “critical” or smaller dimension of an object needed
for a 50% probability of task success. For instance, n50 = 1
for object detection.
Given n50 and the actual number of pixels pairs n across the
critical dimension of an object (which depends on the size of
the object and GSD), the probability for task analysis success
pd given sufficient time to analyze the image is estimated as
pd =
(n/n50)
x0
1 + (n/n50)x0
where x0 = 2.7 + 0.7(n/n50). (2)
In our approach, we use a quadratic approximation of pd
for simplicity. Since (2) varies significantly with altitude, we
define a different operating altitude for each type of EO sensor
in Appendix D.
Ground Sensor ROC: The ROC curve of a sensor
performing binary classification describes the tradeoff between
the sensor’s true positive rate/probability versus false positive
rate/probability as the sensor’s discrimination threshold is
varied. Consider the three solid curves in Fig. 2. These represent
hypothetical “low”, “mid”, and “high” cost ground sensors, with
one-time purchase costs of $15k, $30k, and $45k, respectively.
For each such ground sensor, the discrimination threshold can
be varied to achieve an operating point on the corresponding
curve. As the curves show, a high cost ground sensor provides
the best tradeoff, since for each false positive rate, it provides
a higher true positive rate.
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Fig. 2. ROC curves for different cost ground sensors. Linear and quadratic
approximations are shown as green dashed lines and traces of black dots,
respectively.
In our approach, we use the quadratic approximations of the
curves in Fig. 2 over the interval [0.2, 1.0] for false positive
rates. In order to reliably detect intruders, we need the true
positive rate to be fairly high.
To help understand the effect ground sensors have on system
costs and probabilistic parameters, suppose we choose to
purchase a high cost sensor for Sensor 1. Clearly the purchase
cost is higher than if we had chosen a mid or low cost sensor.
However, each time the ground sensor generates a false positive,
a UAV has to perform an unnecessary area search, which
incurs additional system operational cost. To counteract this,
we could decrease the ground sensor’s false positive rate, but
this would also decrease its true positive rate, resulting in a
higher false negative rate. When a false negative occurs, the
sensor fails to detect the presence of an intruder, the UAV does
not perform an area search, and the intruder goes undetected,
potentially causing the system to violate its specification on
the probability of detecting intruders. A high cost sensor then
mitigates operational cost by providing a lower false positive
rate. Given these tradeoffs between purchase cost, operational
cost, and probability of intruder detection, it is not clear which
sensor minimizes cost while meeting safety specifications on
intruder detection.
In summary, each configuration induces a different system
behavior in terms of probabilities for discovery of intruders
and task cost. The question is, which configuration ensures
satisfaction of a given specification while minimizing the
overall cost.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A probability distribution over a finite or countably infinite
set X is a function µ:X → [0, 1] ⊆ R with ∑x∈X µ(x) =
µ(X) = 1. The set of all distributions on X is Distr(X).
Definition 1: (MDP) A Markov decision process (MDP)
M = (S, sI ,A,P) consists of a finite set of states S, a
unique initial state sI ∈ S, a finite set A of actions, and
a probabilistic transition function P:S ×A× S → [0, 1] ⊆ R
with
∑
s′∈S P(s, α, s′) = 1 for all s ∈ S, α ∈ A.
MDPs operate by means of nondeterministic choices of
actions at each state, whose successors are then determined
probabilistically with respect to the associated probabilities.
The enabled actions at state s ∈ S are denoted by A(s) =
{α ∈ A | ∃s′ ∈ S.P(s, α, s′) > 0}. To avoid deadlock states,
we assume that |A(s)|≥ 1 for all s ∈ S. A cost function
C:S → R≥0 for an MDP M adds cost to a state. If |A(s)|= 1
for all s ∈ S, all actions can be disregarded and the MDP
M reduces to a discrete-time Markov chain (MC). In order
to define a probability measure and expected cost on MDPs,
the nondeterministic choices of actions are resolved by so-
called strategies. For practical reasons, we restrict ourselves to
memoryless strategies, refer to [31] for details.
Definition 2: (Strategy) A randomized strategy for an MDP
M is a function σ:S → Distr(A) such that σ(s)(a) > 0
implies a ∈ A(s). A strategy with σ(s)(a) = 1 for a ∈ A and
σ(b) = 0 for all b ∈ A \ {a} is called deterministic. The set
of all strategies over M is denoted by StrM.
Resolving all nondeterminism for an MDP M with a strategy
σ ∈ StrM yields an induced Markov chain Mσ .
Definition 3: (Induced MC) Let MDP M = (S, sI ,A,P)
and strategy σ ∈ StrM. The MC induced by M and σ is
Mσ = (S, sI ,A,Pσ) where
Pσ(s, s′) =
∑
a∈A(s)
σ(s)(a) · P(s, a, s′) for all s, s′ ∈ S .
a) PRISM’s Guarded Command Language.: We briefly
introduce the syntax and semantics of the probabilistic program-
ming language used to specify probabilistic models in PRISM.
For a finite set Var of integer variables, let V(Var) denote
the set of all variable valuations, i. e. of functions u: Var→ Z
such that u(x) ∈ dom(x) for all x ∈ Var. We assume that the
domains of all variables are finite.
Definition 4 (Probabilistic program, module, command): A
probabilistic program (Var, sI , {M1, . . . ,Mk}) consists of a
set of integer variables Var, an initial variable valuation sI ∈
V(Var) and a finite set of modules {M1, . . . ,Mk}. A module
is a tuple Mi = (Vari,Ai, Ci) with Vari ⊆ Var a set of
variables such that Vari ∩ Varj = ∅ for i 6= j, Ai a finite
set of synchronizing actions, and Ci a finite set of commands.
The action τ with τ 6∈ ⋃ki=1Ai denotes the internal non-
synchronizing action. A command c ∈ Ci has the form
100[α] g → p1: f1 + . . .+ pn: fn;
with α ∈ Ai unionmulti {τ}, g a Boolean predicate (“guard”) over
the variables in Var, pj ∈ [0, 1] ⊆ R with
∑n
j=1 pj = 1, and
fj :V(Var)→ V(Vari) being a variable update function. The
action α of command c is act(c).
A model with several modules is equivalent to a model with a
single module, obtained by computing the parallel composition
of these modules. For details we refer to the documentation of
PRISM.
1) Specifications.: We consider reachability properties and
expected cost properties. For MC D with states S, let PrDs (♦T )
denote the probability of reaching a set of target states T ⊆ S
from state s ∈ S; simply PrD(♦T ) denotes the probability from
initial state sI . For threshold λ ∈ [0, 1], a reachability property
asserts that a target state is to be reached with probability at
most λ, denoted by ϕ = P≤λ(♦T ). The property is satisfied
by D, written D |= ϕ, iff PrD(♦T ) ≤ λ.
The cost of a path through MC D to a set of goal states
G ⊆ S is the sum of action costs visited along the path. The
expected cost of a finite path is the product of its probability
and its reward. For PrD(♦G) = 1, the expected cost ECD(♦G)
of reaching G is the sum of expected costs of all paths leading
to G. Using recent results from [30], we also consider the
probability PrD(♦T ∧ C < n), where the total cost C, i. e.,
the sum of the costs of all paths satisfying ♦T , is bounded by
n. Formal definitions are given in e.g., [31].
IV. STRUCTURED SYNTHESIS
In this section, we introduce the formal model to define a
structure on MDPs, and we define the synthesis problem.
A. Multiple-instance MDPs
We use a variant of a parametric Markov decision pro-
cess (pMDPs) which we call a multiple–instance Markov
decision process (MIMDP). Formally, we define a finite set
V = {p1, . . . , pn} of parameters. Each parameter p ∈ V has a
finite range of values Val(p) = {v1, . . . , vm} ⊆ R. A valuation
is a function u:V → ⋃p∈V Val(p) that respects the parameter
ranges, meaning that for a parameter p, u(p) = v ∈ Val(p).
Let U(V ) denote the (finite) set of possible valuations on V .
Let Expr(V ) denote the set of expressions over V and p ∈ l
state that parameter p occurs in expression l ∈ Expr(V ). Val(l)
denotes the (finite) set of possible values for l ∈ Expr(V )
according to the parameters p ∈ l and their value ranges Val(p).
With a slight abuse of notation, we lift valuation functions
from U(V ) to expressions: u:Expr(V )→ ⋃l∈Expr(V )Val(l).
In particular, u(l) = v ∈ Val(l) is the valuation of l obtained
by the instantiation of each p ∈ l with u(p). Note that for a
particular valuation of two or more expressions l, l′ in Expr(V ),
there is nothing constraining the valuation of the underlying
parameters to be consistent. That is, a parameter valuation u(p)
that results in expression valuation u(l) might be different than
a u′(p) that results in u(l′).
Example 1: Consider V = {p, q}, Val(p) = {0.1, 0.2},
Val(q) = {0.3, 0.4}, and Expr(V ) = {p + q, p + 2 · q}.
The ranges of values for the expressions are Val(p + q) =
{0.4, 0.5, 0.6}, and Val(p + 2 · q) = {0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}. A
possible valuation on the parameters is u(p) = 0.1, u(q) =
0.3 determining an associated valuation on the expressions
u(p+ q) = 0.4, u(p+ 2 · q) = 0.7. A possible valuation on the
expressions is υ(p+ q) = 0.4, υ(p+ 2 · q) = 1, however, this
valuation is not consistent with any valuation on the parameters;
the first is consistent with u(p) = 0.1 and u(q) = 0.3, while
the second is consistent with u(p) = 0.2 and u(q) = 0.4.
Definition 5: (MIMDP) A multiple-instance MDP M =
(S, V, sI ,A,P) has a finite set S of states, a finite set V
of parameters with associated finite sets of valuations from
Val(V ), a unique initial state sI ∈ S, a finite set A of actions,
and a transition function P:S ×A× S → Expr(V ).
Similarly to MDPs, we use A(s) ⊆ A = {α |
P (s, a, s′) is defined for some s′ ∈ S} to denote the set of ac-
tions enabled in state s ∈ S. A cost function C:S → Expr(V )
associates (parametric) cost to states. For each valuation
u ∈ Val(V ) of parameters, the instantiated MIMDP is M[u].
s0
p+ q
s1
2 · p
s3 s2
p
r s
q
1 1
(a) MIMDP M
s0
{0.7, 1.1, 0.9, 1.3}
s1
{0.8, 1.2}
s3 s2
{0.4, 0.6}
{0.6, 0.4} {0.7, 0.3}{0.3, 0.7}
1 1
(b) Values for M
Fig. 3. An example MIMDP and its possible valuations.
We denote the set of all expressions occurring in the MIMDP
by LM.
Note that an MIMDP is a special kind of parametric MDP
(pMDP) [11], [27] in the sense that each parametric cost and
probabilities can only take a finite number of values, i. e.,
there are multiple but finite instantiations of a MIMDP. The
state–of–the–art tools such as PARAM [11], PRISM [12], or
PROPhESY [20], however, only allow for defining continuous
intervals to restrict parameter valuations.
Example 2: Fig. 3(a) shows a MIMDP M with parametric
transition probabilities p, q, r and s. Costs are p + q and 2 ·
p. Note that M contains no nondeterministic choices. The
valuations of the parameters are given by
Val(p) = {0.4, 0.6}, Val(q) = {0.3, 0.7},
Val(r) = {0.6, 0.4}, Val(s) = {0.7, 0.3},
Val(p+ q) = {0.7, 1.1, 0.9, 1.3}, Val(2 · p) = {0.8, 1.2} .
These finite sets of valuations are also depicted in Fig. 3(b) to
indicate possible instantiations of the MIMDP. E.g., a valuation
u with u(p) = 0.4 and u(r) = 0.4 is not well–defined as it
induces no well–defined probability distribution.
Formal Problem Statement
Problem 1: For a MIMDPM, a specification ϕ = P≤λ(♦T ),
and a set of goal states G , we want to find a valuation
u ∈ U(V ) and a strategy σ for the MDP M[u] such that
M[u]σ |= ϕ, and the expected cost ECM[u]σ (♦G) is minimal.
V. AN INTEGER PROGRAMMING APPROACH
We first observe that Problem 1 is in fact a multi-objective
verification problem an requires randomized strategies as in
Def. 2 [13], [10], [16]. We first formulate a corresponding
optimization problem using the following variables:
• cs ∈ R≥0 for each s ∈ S represents the expected cost to
reach G ⊆ S from s.
• ps ∈ [0, 1] for each s ∈ S represents the probability to
reach T ⊆ S from s.
• σαs ∈ [0, 1] for each s ∈ S and α ∈ A represents the
probability to choose action α ∈ A(s) at state s.
We also introduce a characteristic variable xu ∈ {0, 1} for
each valuation u ∈ U(V ). If xu is set to 1, all parameters and
expressions are evaluated using u.
minimize csI (3)
subject to
psI ≤ λ (4)
∀s ∈ T. ps = 1 (5)
∀s ∈ G. cs = 0 (6)∑
u∈U(V )
xu = 1 (7)
∀s ∈ S. ps =
∑
α∈A(s)
σαs ·(∑
s′∈S
∑
u∈U(V )
xu · u(P(s, α, s′)) · ps′
)
(8)
∀s ∈ S. cs =
∑
α∈A(s)
σαs ·
(
u(C(s)) +
∑
s′∈S
∑
u∈U(V )
xu · u(P(s, α, s′)) · u(C(s′))
)
(9)
∀s ∈ S. ∀α ∈ A(s).
∑
s′∈S
∑
u∈U(V )
xu · u(P(s, α, s′)) = 1
(10)
Theorem 1 (Soundness and completeness): The optimization
problem (3) – (10) is sound in the sense that each minimizing
assignment induces a solution to Problem 1. It is complete
in the sense that for each solution to Problem 1 there is a
minimizing assignment for (3) – (10).
a) Proof Sketch.: The first two equations induce satisfac-
tion of the specifications: (3) minimizes the expected cost to
reach goal states G ⊆ S at sI ; (4) ensures that the probability
to reach the target states T ⊆ S from sI is not higher than the
threshold. (5) and (6) set the probability and the expected cost
at target and goal states to 1 and 0, respectively. (7) ensures for
all possibles values u ∈ U(V ) that exactly one corresponding
characteristic variable xu is set to 1. In (8), ps is assigned the
probability of reaching T from s by multiplying the probability
to reach each successor s′ with the probability of reaching T
from s′, depending on the scheduler variables σαs . The variables
cs are analogously assigned the expected cost to reach G in
(9). In (10), it is ensured that the concrete instantiations chosen
at each transition form well–defined probability distributions.
Any satisfying assignment yields a well-defined randomized
strategy and a well-defined assignment of parameters. Moreover,
such an assignment necessarily satisfies the safety specification
ϕ = P≤λ(♦T ), as the probability to reach T is ensured to
be smaller than or equal to λ. Likewise, the expected cost to
reach G from the initial state is minimized while at each state
the cs variables are assigned the exact expected cost. Thus, a
satisfying assignment induces a solution to Problem 1.
Completeness is given by construction, as all instantiations
of Problem 1 may be encoded by (3) – (10).
b) Complexity of the Optimization Problem: Consider con-
straint (8), where an integer variable xv is multiplied with the
real–valued variable ps′ . Such constraints render this program
a non–linear integer optimization problem (NILP). The number
of constraints is governed by the number of state and action
pairs or the number of possible instantiations of expressions
i. e., the size of the problem is in O(|Sr|·|A|+|Val(LM)|2).
The problem is, that already solving nonlinear problems without
integer variables is NP-hard [32], [6]. Summarized, despite
the compact problem representation in form of a MIMDP, the
problem is hard.
VI. TRANSFORMATION OF PRISM PROGRAMS
We present a solution of Problem 1 that incorporates a direct
transformation of MIMDPs specified as probabilistic programs
in the PRISM language as in Def. 4. Similar to [27], we see
the possible choices of parameter values as nondeterminism.
Say, a parameter p ∈ V has valuations Val(p) = {v1, v2} and
state s has cost C(s) = 2 · p. First, the MIMDP is transformed
in the following way. From state s, a nondeterministic choice
between actions αv1 and αv1 replaces the original transitions.
Each action leads with probability one to a fresh state having
cost 2 · v1 or 2 · v2, respectively. From these states, the original
transitions of state s emanate. Using a model checker to
compute minimal or maximal expected cost in this transformed
MDP allows to determine upper and lower bounds to a solution
of Problem 1. The reason is, that we drop dependencies between
parameters. That is, if at one place p is assigned its value v1, it
is not necessarily assigned the same everywhere in the MIMDP.
Then, we present a transformation that ensures parameter
dependencies. Intuitively, in the resulting MDP each nondeter-
ministic choice corresponding to a parameter value leads to a
(sub-)MDP where the assignment of that value is fixed.
Note that if the original MIMDP has nondeterministic
choices, we introduce a new level of nondeterminism. In that
case, we assume that both types of nondeterminism minimize
the expected cost for our problem. Alternatively, one can
generate and evaluate a stochastic game [15].
Program Transformation 1—Parametric Cost
Assume a PRISM program M = (Var,A, C) as in Def. 4, and
a parametric reward structure of the form:
100rewards
101g1: l
102end rewards
with g1 the guard and l ∈ Expr(Var). Let Val(l) =
{v1, . . . , vm} be the finite set of instantiations of l with vi ∈ R
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. We introduce a fresh (characteristic) variable
xl with dom(xl) = {0, . . . ,m}. Intuitively, there is a unique
variable value for xl for each valuation from Val(l). Consider
now all commands c ∈ C of the form
100[α] g → p1: f1 + . . .+ pn: fn;
with g |= g1, i. e., the guard of the command satisfies the guard
of the reward structure. Replace each such commands c by the
following set of commands:
100[] g → 1:x′l = 1;
101
...
102[] g → 1:x′l = m;
103[α]
∨
1≤i≤m
xl = i→ p1: f1 + . . .+ pn: fn;
and replace the reward structure for each command c by
100rewards
101xl = 1: v1;
102
...
103xl = m: vm;
104end rewards
Intuitively, for each state satisfying the guard, m transitions
with the same guard are added. Each of the transitions leads to
new states with the instantiated rewards. From these states, the
transitions of the original system emanate. This transformation
corresponds to a nondeterministic choice between the concrete
reward values.
Program Transformation 2—Parametric Transitions.
For program M = (Var,A, C), consider a command c ∈ C of
the form
100[α] g → p1: f1 + . . .+ pn: fn
with p1, . . . , pn ∈ Expr(Var). Let Val(p1, . . . , pn) =
{vn1 , . . . , vnm} with vni = (vi1, . . . , vin) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
vij ∈ R for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Replace each such command c by the
following set of commands:
100[α] g → v11: f1 + . . .+ v1n: fn;
101
...
102[α] g → vm1: f1 + . . .+ vmn: fn;
Intuitively, after the transformation, m transitions with concrete
probabilities emanate from the states. As all transitions satisfy
the same guard, again a nondeterministic choice between these
transitions is induced.
For a program M , we denote the program after Transforma-
tion 1 and Transformation 2 by M ′. The induced MIMDP of
M is denoted by MM and the induced MDP of M ′ by MM ′ .
Program Transformation 3—Parameter Dependencies
We finally propose a transformation of the transformed MDP
MM ′ which enforces that once a parameter is assigned a
specific value, this assignment is always used. Therefore, we
add a control module to the PRISM formulation.
In the transformed MDP, taking actions αv1 or αv2 induces
that parameter p is assigned its value v1 or v2. In the PRISM
encoding, the corresponding commands are of the form
100[αv1] g1 → . . . ;
101[αv2] g2 → . . . ;
where g1 and g2 are arbitrary guards. Now, for each of these
actions αv1 and αv2 , we use control variables qv1 and qv2 and
build a control module of the form:
100module control
101qv1 : bool init 0;
102qv2 : bool init 0;
103[αv1] ¬qv1 → (q′v1 = true);
104[αv1] qv1 → (q′v1 = true);
105[αv2] ¬qv2 → (q′v2 = true);
106[αv2] qv2 → (q′v2 = true);
107endmodule
If this module is included in the parallel composition, a control
variable is set to true once the corresponding action is taken
in the MDP. We can now guard the commands such that
only non–conflicting assignments are possible. The original
commands are transformed in the following way:
100[αv1] g1 ∧ ¬qv2 → . . . ;
101[αv2] g2 ∧ ¬qv1 → . . . ;
In the resulting controlled MDP, it is not possible that the
original parameter p is at one place assigned v1 and at another
place v2.
Basically, we transform an integer nonlinear optimization
problem to a linear program at the cost of increasing the size
of the underlying MDP. We denote the program M subject to
Transformation 3 by Mc. Given a program defining a MIMDP
M which is subject to Transformations 1 – 3, we denote the
resulting program by M ′c and the induced MDP by MM ′c .
Proposition 1: Given the MDPMM ′c , a reachability property
ϕ = P≤λ(♦T ), and a set of goal states G. Finding a strategy
σ ∈ StrMM′c that induces the minimal expected cost ECM
σ
M′c
under all strategies that satisfy MσM ′c |= ϕ provides a solution
to Problem 1.
The correctness of that proposition is given by the step-by-step
transformation provided above. Basically, introducing a nonde-
terministic choices for all parameter values is nothing else then
trying out all these values. With the control module, consistent
choices are enforced. Intuitively, the first nondeterministic
choice corresponding to a specific parameter value leads to
(sub-)MDP that allows only that value. We exploit highly
optimized and specialized model checking tools. Aggressive
state space reduction techniques together with a preprocessing
that removes inconsistent combinations of parameter values
beforehand render the MIMDP synthesis problem feasible.
VII. EXPERIMENTS
We first report on results for the case study from Sec. II.
First, we created a PRISM program for the MIMDP underlying
all aspects of the shipyard example with 430 lines of code.
We can use the program to generate an explicit Markov chain
(MC) model where the parameter instantiations are fixed. That
explicit model has 1 728 states and 5 145 transitions. From
the MIMDP model, we generate the MDP according to the
transformations in Sec. VI. The underlying (extended) PRISM
program has 720 lines of code. The explicit MDP generated
from the transformed program has 2 912 states and 64 048
transitions. For our case study, the size of the transformed
MDP is reasonable: From the MIMDP to the MDP, states
increase by a factor of 1.8, transitions by a factor of 12.5.
The experimental results show several (partially unforesee-
able) intricacies of the case study. We have the following
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structure for the MIMDP defined by parameters and their
valuation sets. For details see Sec. II.
• EO sensor for the UAV: VEO = {480p, 720p, 1080p}.
• Deviation from the UAV operational altitude:
VAlt{−60,−30, 0, 30, 60}.
• ROC ground sensors (Sensor 1, Sensor 2, Sensor 3, Bay
Area Network): VROC = {low,med, high}.
• False positive rates for each ROC ground sensor: Vfp =
{0.2, 0.1, . . . , 1.0}.
This structure induces 1 440 possibilities to configure the
system. However, as we restricted all ground sensors to have the
same quality, we have only 360 possibilities. We implemented
several benchmark scripts using the Python interface of the
storm model checker. For each of the results presented below,
we used a script to iteratively try all possible combinations for
measures of interest, and compared the optimal value obtained
from the transformed MDP to these results. We performed the
experiments on a MacBook Pro with a 2.3 GHz Intel Core i5
CPU and 8GB of RAM.
Probability of Recognition Error: First, we investigate
the probability of not recognizing an intruder—after a ground
sensor was triggered—in dependence of the number of missions
an UAV flies. The curves shown in Fig. 4 depend on the
deviation from the standard UAV operational altitude and on
the type of EO sensor. The cheap 480p EO sensor has the lowest
probability for an recognition error at a low altitude. For all
other sensors and altitudes, the probability quickly approaches
one. The cumulated model checking time was 78.13 seconds,
computing the optimal result on the transformed MDP took
2.3 seconds.
Probability of False Alarms: For the ROC sensors, we
measured the probability for a false alarm, depending again on
the number of missions. The curves in Fig. 5 depend on the
quality of the ROC sensor and on the false positive rates. The
high-quality sensor is the only one with relatively low false
alarm probabilities. The cumulated model checking time was
52.13 seconds, computing the optimal result on the transformed
MDP took less than one second.
Probability and Cost Tradeoffs: Finally, we show the
expected cost in dependence of the number of missions in
Fig. 6. Additionally, for each data point, the probability for
a recognition error needs to be below 50% . The violation of
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this property is indicated by the maximum value 4.5 · 10−5.
The results show that for this kind of property indeed the low-
resolution (480p) sensor at lowest altitude is the best choice,
as it has relatively low initial cost. While the task cost at low
altitude is slightly larger than at higher altitudes, with this
sensor, the UAV is able to maintain the probability threshold of
safely recognizing an intruder. The cumulated model checking
time was 59.1 seconds, computing the optimal result on the
transformed MDP took 1.2 seconds.
PRISM Benchmarks
We additionally assessed the feasibility of our approach on
well-known case studies, parametric Markov chain examples
from the PARAM-website [22], that originally stem from the
PRISM benchmark suite [14]. We tested a parametric version
of the Knuth-Yao Die (Die), several instances of the Zeroconf
protocol [7], and the Crowds protocol [5]. For benchmarking,
we used the standard configuration of storm. Table I shows
the results, where we list the number of states and transitions as
well as the model checking times (MC): “transformed” refers
to the MDP after Transformation 1 and 2, “controlled refers
to the MDP after Transformations 1 – 3. For the original
parametric Markov chains, we tested the time to perform state
elimination, which is the standard model checking method for
such models [11], [8]. We used a timeout (TO) of 600 seconds.
From the results, we draw the following conclusions: (1) The
TABLE I
PARAMETRIC BENCHMARKS
Model Type States Transitions MC (s) SE (s)
Die
parametric 13 20 — 0.04
transformed 13 48 0.04 —
controlled 37 60 0.02 —
Zeroconf1
parametric 1 004 2 005 — 60.3
transformed 1 004 6 009 0.18 —
controlled 9 046 18 075 0.19 —
Zeroconf2
parametric 10 004 20 005 — TO
transformed 10 004 60 009 0.11 —
controlled 90 046 180 075 0.59 —
Zeroconf3
parametric 100 004 200 005 — TO
transformed 100 004 600 009 0.90 —
controlled 900 046 1 800 075 7.36 —
Crowds1
parametric 1 367 2 027 — 0.97
transformed 1 367 3 347 0.04 —
controlled 12 328 18 378 0.11 —
Crowds2
parametric 7 421 12 881 — 5.80
transformed 7 421 20 161 0.08 —
controlled 66 826 116 148 0.42 —
Crowds3
parametric 104 512 246 082 — 128.62
transformed 104 512 349 042 0.74 —
controlled 940 675 2 215 167 6.29 —
Crowds4
parametric 572 153 1 698 233 — 18.81
transformed 572 153 2 261 273 4.39 —
controlled 5 149 474 15 284 736 33.70 —
Crowds5
parametric 2 018 094 7 224 834 — TO
transformed 2 018 094 9 208 354 17.15 —
controlled 18 162 973 65 024 355 137.71 —
first two program transformations only increase the number of
transitions with respect to the MIMDP model, and the third
transformation increases the states and transitions by up to
one order of magnitude. (2) Except for the Crowds4 instance,
model checking of the transformed and controlled MDP is
by far superior to performing state elimination. (3) For these
standard benchmarks, we are able to handle instances with
millions of states.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We introduced the structured synthesis problem for Markov
decision processes. Driven by a concrete case study from
the area of physical security, we defined multiple-instance
MDPs and demonstrated the hardness of the corresponding
synthesis problem. As a feasible solution, we presented a
transformation to an MDP where nondeterministic choices
represented the underlying structure of the multiple-instance
MDP. Our experiments showed that we are able to analyze
meaningful measures for such problems. In the future, we will
further investigate intricacies of the case study, for instance
regarding continuous state spaces. Moreover, we will extend our
methodology to models based on reinforcement learning [34],
also considering safety aspects [25], [21].
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APPENDIX
A. UAV Task Distances
TABLE II
TASK DISTANCES IN METERS FOR POINT SEARCH TASKS.
Task dg d′g
Main Gate 1000 1000
Power Generator 1100 1100
Sensor 1 3250 3250
Sensor 2 3375 3375
Sensor 3 2375 2375
Bay Sensor Network 3750 3750
For a point search task tp ∈ {Main Gate, Power Generator,
Sensor 1, Sensor 2, Sensor 3, Bay Sensor Network}, let dg(tp)
be the distance from the Ground Control Station to the task
location and d′g(tp) be the distance back, as given in Table II.
Then the total distance d(tp) traveled to perform task tp is
d(tp) = dg(tp) + d
′
g(tp). (11)
In this case distances are symmetric, with dg(tp) = d′g(tp) for
all tp.
TABLE III
TASK DISTANCES IN METERS FOR LINE SEARCH TASKS.
Task dg d′g dl
Highway 2000 2000 2875
Runway 1000 1250 2000
Stream 3250 3250 2050
For a line search task tl ∈ {Highway, Runway, Stream},
let dg(tl) be the distance from the Ground Control Station to
the start of the line, d′g(tl) the distance back to the Ground
Control Station from the end of the line, and dl(tl) the length
of the line to be searched, as given in Table III. Then the total
distance d(tl) traveled to perform task tl is
d(tl) = dg(tl) + dl(tl) + d
′
g(tl). (12)
For an area search task ta ∈ {Bridge, Main Office,
Warehouse, Truck Depot, Shipyard Office, Shipyard, West Bay,
East Bay, Airfield Office, Airfield}, let dg(ta) be the distance
from the Ground Control Station to the starting corner of the
search, d′g(ta) be the distance back to the Ground Control
Station from the terminal corner of the search, and let dw(ta)
and dh(ta) be the width and height of the area to be searched,
as given in Table III. In order to sweep an EO sensor footprint
across the entire search area, a UAV has to make several parallel
passes over the area along its height. Let e¯w be the width of a
UAV’s EO sensor footprint at the UAV’s standard operating
altitude. Then the total distance d(ta) traveled to perform task
ta is approximately
d(ta) = dg(ta) +
dw(ta)
e¯w
dh(ta) + d
′
g(ta). (13)
When an area search is prompted by the detection of an
intruder by a ground sensor, the distance calculation is modified
to account for travel time to the sensor as well as a potentially
different sensor footprint width ew. Let the total distance in
response to a ground sensor be ds(ta). Then
d(ta) = ds(ta) + d
′
s(ta) +
dw(ta)
ew
dh(ta) + d
′
g(ta). (14)
B. Image GSD
We measure GSD G as the number of pixels across the
width of an EO sensor footprint at its center as shown in
Fig. 7, resulting in the expression
G =
ew
rh
=
2halt tan(η/2)/sin(θg)
rh
, (15)
where ew is the width of the EO sensor footprint and rh the
horizontal resolution of the EO sensor. Note that ew depends
Fig. 7. The footprint of an EO sensor, which depends on gimbal elevation
angle, field of view, and UAV altitude.
on UAV altitude halt, EO sensor field of view η, and EO sensor
gimbal angle θg .
In the case study, most objects are large enough that GSD
will not be a concern. However, intruders on foot near Sensor 1,
Sensor 2, or Sensor 3, or intruders on small personal watercraft
near the Bay Sensor Network will require a low GSD. For
detecting intruders indicated by these ground sensors, we
assume a minimum of pi/12 for η, since smaller values tend
to result in a shaky stream of video images due to noise in
UAV flight trajectories, and we assume θg is set to pi/2 so
that the camera is pointing straight down. With η = pi/12 and
θg = pi/2, the expression for G becomes
G =
2halt tan(pi/24)
rh
. (16)
C. Object Recognition versus Altitude, Speed, and Sensor
Quality
The UAVs in the case study are essentially tools for carrying
out various surveillance tasks in collaboration with human
operators. For each surveillance task, a UAV flies over the
associated region and sends imagery back to the ground control
station, where an operator analyzes it. The level of analysis the
operator is able to perform depends on many factors, including
the size of objects of interest relative to the resolution of the
imagery and how long the operator is able to view objects in
the imagery.
TABLE IV
BASE TASK DISTANCES IN METERS FOR AREA SEARCH TASKS.
Task ta dg(ta) d′g(ta) ds(ta) d′s(ta) dh(ta) dw(ta)
Bridge 3750 3500 dg(Sensor 1) = 3250 500 375 600
Main Office 2600 1525 dg(Sensor 1) = 3250 625 500 1100
Warehouse 2750 1250 dg(Sensor 1) = 3250 575 700 1500
Truck Depot 2950 2100 dg(Sensor 2) = 3375 450 625 1200
Shipyard Office 3350 3150 dg(Sensor 2) = 3375 425 550 1000
Shipyard 3625 3050 {dg(Sensor 2), dg(Bay Sensor)} 500 800 700
West Bay 4250 4900 dg(Bay Sensor) = 3750 1000 575 1000
East Bay 3125 3350 dg(Bay Sensor) = 3750 1500 575 2000
Airfield Office 2100 2000 dg(Sensor 3) = 2375 450 550 500
Airfield 1750 2875 dg(Sensor 3) = 2375 700 950 1625
Models of human performance for basic visual analysis tasks
are often traced to research performed by Johnson in the context
of night vision systems [1]. Johnson classified visual analysis
tasks into several different categories, including detection,
recognition, and identification. Detection is roughly defined as
the ability to discern whether an object of significance is present
in an image; recognition as determining the class of an object
relative to similarly sized objects, e.g., a truck versus a car;
and identification as distinguishing between specific members
of the same class, e.g., a man versus a woman. Johnson
characterized the probability of successfully performing these
tasks as a function of the number of line pairs across the
critical dimension of an object in an image, where a line pair
corresponds to two lines of pixels in digital imagery and critical
dimension refers to the smaller dimension of an object. Much
of this research was originally performed on targets with aspect
ratios less than 2:1. Later work by Moser found that for objects
with large aspect ratios of about 10:1, the number of line pairs
or pixels across the area of the object is a better predictor of
task performance [2]. As given in [4], Table V lists n50 values,
i.e., numbers of line pairs across an object needed for a 50%
probability of successfully performing a visual analysis task
on the object. Note that the 1D criterion applies to the critical
dimension of an object with a “small” aspect ratio, while the
2D criterion applies to the geometric mean of the height and
width of an object with a “large” aspect ratio.
TABLE V
JOHNSON CHART – THE NUMBER OF LINE PAIRS NEEDED FOR A 50%
PROBABILITY OF PERFORMING A VISUAL ANALYSIS TASK ON AN OBJECT.
Task type 1D n50 2D n50 Description
Detection 1.0 0.75 Object is present
Recognition 4.0 3.0 Class of object
Identification 8.0 6.0 Class member of object
Suppose there are n line pairs across an object in an image.
Then given an unlimited amount of time to view the image, the
probability of an operator being able to successfully perform
a visual analysis task can be estimated as
P∞ =
(n/n50)
x0
1 + (n/n50)x0
where x0 = 2.7 + 0.7(n/n50).
(17)
Further details on (17) can be found in [33].
Suppose UAVs in the case study are equipped with stan-
dard electro-optical (EO) sensors. Most EO sensors feature
adjustable magnification, which allows the sensor’s field of
view to vary. An EO sensor may also be mounted on a gimbal,
so that it can be pointed in different directions relative to the
UAV. As shown in Fig. 7, the size of the EO sensor’s footprint
on the ground depends on its gimbal elevation angle θg, its
vertical field of view ηv , its horizontal field of view ηh, and the
altitude of the UAV halt. Suppose the vertical and horizontal
fields of view are equal so that ηh = ηv. Suppose also that
the sensor is pointed straight down so that θg = 90◦. Then the
height and width dw of the sensor footprint will be the same,
with
dw = 2halt tan(ηh/2). (18)
The region that lies within the sensor footprint is projected
onto a sensor array that converts light into electrical signals.
The resolution of the resulting image depends on the resolution
of this sensor array. As shown in Table VI, EO sensors with
different resolutions can be purchased for different prices,
where rv and rh are vertical and horizontal resolution in pixels.
Given the sensor resolution, current field of view, UAV altitude,
and assuming rh > rv , we can calculate a conservative upper
bound on the ground sample distance gsd of the image in
m/pixel as
gsd =
dw
rv
. (19)
The number of line pairs n across an object of size do in the
image is then
n =
do
2gsd
=
dorv
2dw
=
dorv
4halt tan(ηh/2)
. (20)
TABLE VI
HYPOTHETICAL COSTS FOR EO SENSORS WITH DIFFERENT IMAGE
RESOLUTIONS.
Resolution rh × rv
640×480 1280×720 1920×1080
(480p) (720p) (1080p)
Cost $15k $30k $45k
D. UAV Altitude
Since the probability that a human operator can analyze
an object in an image defined in (2) varies significantly with
altitude halt, we define a different operating altitude for each
type of EO sensor. Let rlh, r
m
h , and r
h
h be the horizontal
resolution of the low (480p), mid (720p), and high (1080p)
resolution EO sensor options, respectively. Assume do = 0.5
m for intruders, both humans on foot and small watercraft.
Then let us define operating altitudes hl0, h
m
0 , and h
h
0 such
that the probability of detection pld, p
m
d , and p
h
d for each
EO sensor option is approximately 0.95 at the corresponding
operating altitude. In this case, hl0 = 296 m, h
m
0 = 593 m,
and hh0 = 889 m. Suppose we allow altitude to vary by an
amount ∆hl,∆hm,∆hh ∈ [−60, 60] m around each operating
altitude. Then Fig. 8 shows the probability of detecting an
intruder as ∆hl,∆hm, and ∆hh vary for the three EO sensor
options around operating altitudes hl0, h
m
0 , and h
h
0 . Linear and
∆ hi (m)
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Fig. 8. Probability of detecting an intruder for ∆h ∈ [−60, 60] for three EO
sensor resolution options. Linear approximations are shown as dashed lines,
and quadratic approximations are shown as traces of black dots.
quadratic approximations were computed using MATLAB’s
constrained linear least squares solver lsqlin with the constraint
that the approximated function have an upper bound of 1.
Linear approximations, shown as dashed lines in Fig. 2, are
pld = −0.0008∆hl + 0.9461 for ∆hl ∈ [−60, 60] (21)
pmd = −0.0004∆hm + 0.9498 for ∆hm ∈ [−60, 60] (22)
phd = −0.0003∆hh + 0.9505 for ∆hh ∈ [−60, 60], (23)
and quadratic approximations, plotted with dots in Fig. 2, are
pld = −0.000004∆hl
2 − 0.000810∆hl + 0.951075
for ∆hl ∈ [−60, 60] (24)
pmd = −0.000001∆hm2 − 0.0004051∆hm + 0.9511169
for ∆hm ∈ [−60, 60] (25)
phd = −0.000000∆hh
2 − 0.000300∆hh + 0.950500
for ∆hh ∈ [−60, 60], (26)
with linear and quadratic approximations for phd being equiva-
lent.
The altitude at which a UAV performs an area search will
also change the amount of time needed to perform the search.
This is because the width of the EO sensor footprint ew changes
with altitude, and in order to sweep the EO sensor footprint
over the entire area, a UAV must make approximately dw/ew
passes of length dh over the area, where dw is the task area
width and dh task area height, as given in Table IV. Let us
consider how this changes the operational cost of an area search
when searching for intruders. Suppose cost per flight hour is
approximately 1,000 dollars per hour or cf = 5/18 dollars per
second. Suppose a UAV’s standard operating altitude h0 for
surveillance tasks other than intruder area searches is h0 = hh0 ,
its standard ground speed vg is 15 m/s, and its speed va to
ascend or descend during altitude changes is 5 m/s. Suppose
for intruder area searches, a UAV changes altitude from h0 to
hi0+∆h
i for ∆hi ∈ [−60, 60] m, i ∈ {l,m, h} before a search,
then changes back to h0 after a search. Then the modified cost
for an area search task ta for intruders is approximately
c(ta) =
5
18
(
ds(ta) + d
′
s(ta) +
1
ew
dw(ta)dh(ta)
vg
+
2(h0 − hi0 −∆hi)
va
+ d′g(ta)
)
, (27)
which replaces the expression for cost (1) given in Section II.
Fig. 9 shows how 1/ew changes for the low, mid, and high
cost EO sensor options given their operating points. In our
approach, we obtain the following linear approximations to
use in (27), shown as dashed lines in Fig. 9,
1/elw = −0.000045∆hl + 0.013026 for ∆hl ∈ [−60, 60]
(28)
1/emw = −0.000011∆hm + 0.006428 for ∆hm ∈ [−60, 60]
(29)
1/ehw = −0.000005∆hh + 0.004279 for ∆hh ∈ [−60, 60],
(30)
and the following quadratic approximations to use in (27),
plotted as black dots in Fig. 9,
1/elw = 0.0000002∆h
l2 − 0.0000445hl + 0.0128284
for ∆hl ∈ [−60, 60] (31)
1/emw = −0.0000000∆hm2 − 0.0000110hm + 0.0064280
for ∆hm ∈ [−60, 60] (32)
1/ehw = −0.0000000∆hh2 − 0.0000050hh + 0.0042790
for ∆hh ∈ [−60, 60], (33)
with 1/emw and 1/e
h
w each having equivalent linear and
quadratic approximations.
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Fig. 9. Plots of 1/ew for ∆h ∈ [−60, 60] for three sensor resolution options.
Linear approximations are shown as dashed lines, and quadratic approximations
are shown as traces of black dots.
E. ROC Curve Approximations
Approximations of the ROC curves were computed using
MATLAB’s constrained linear least squares solver lsqlin with
the constraint that the approximated function have an upper
bound of 1. Let plf , p
m
f , and p
h
f be the false positive rate
for low, mid, and high cost sensors respectively, and let plt,
pmt , and p
h
t be the true positive rate for low, mid, and high
cost sensors respectively. Then we have the following linear
approximations, shown as dashed lines in Fig. 2,
plt = 0.0041p
l
f + 0.9949 for p
l
f ∈ [0.2, 1.0] (34)
pmt = 0.0853p
m
f + 0.9137 for p
m
f ∈ [0.2, 1.0] (35)
pht = for p
h
f ∈ [0.2, 1.0], (36)
and the following quadratic approximations, plotted with dots
in Fig. 2,
plt = −0.0183plf
2
+ 0.0273plf + 0.9888 for p
l
f ∈ [0.2, 1.0]
(37)
pmt = −0.2243pmf 2 + 0.3779pmf + 0.8391 for pmf ∈ [0.2, 1.0]
(38)
pht = −0.4676phf
2
+ 0.9213phf + 0.5346 for p
h
f ∈ [0.2, 1.0].
(39)
Let qf be the false negative rate and qt be the true negative
rate. Then note that given a true positive rate pt and a false
positive rate pf , qf = 1− pt and qt = 1− pf .
